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REMARKS OF GILLIAN E. METZGERt
PROF. GILLIAN E. METZGER*
Thanks for having me, I'm glad to be here. I'm going to take
for granted the principle that candor and transparency in judicial
reasoning is a very good thing. The process of judicial decision
making is a process of giving reasoned explanations, of holding up
reasons and arguments for refutation. Whether adjudication turns
mainly on such reason giving or instead on judicial policy prefer-
ences is of course a matter of some dispute, but I think it is rela-
tively noncontentious to say that reason giving is both an important
constituent of, and an important constraint on, the process of adju-
dication-particularly constitutional adjudication. And it follows
that candor about these reasons-about what's really driving ajudi-
cial decision-is important. Such candor is particularly important
in regard to precedent, because another important constraint in
the area of constitutional adjudication is the need to take seriously
decisions that courts, both yours and others, have previously issued.
The difficult part is taking this principle of candor and translat-
ing it down into specific contexts. Then it becomes necessary to
address harder questions, such as how much candor is needed,
when less candor is a source of concern and when it is not. That is
more the level on which I am going to focus my remarks on the
importance of candor today, and I thought that I would address it
through the prism of some of the Supreme Court's decisions of this
last term, as Cristina [Rodriguez] mentioned.
It's fair to say, I think, that candor and transparency in judicial
decision making, particularly in regard to precedent, didn't fare
that well last term. There were a number of decisions that seemed
inconsistent with prior precedent, where the Court either failed to
acknowledge and really front that inconsistency, or failed to explain
and adequately distinguish the precedent. When I actually started
thinking about these decisions, however, I was surprised to find out
that in the end, the Court's lack of candor about precedent was not,
t This is a modified transcript of remarks given by Professor Gillian E.
Metzger at the 2008 Symposium of the New York University Annual Survey of American
Law (March 11, 2008). The Symposium was entitled Tradeoffs of Candor: Does
Judicial Transparency Erode Legitimacy? Professor Metzger spoke on the panel
entitled "Transparency and Stare Decisis." The recording of the speech is on file
with the New York University Annual Survey of American Law.
* Professor of Law, Columbia Law School.
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on its own, that troubling to me. What I did find troubling was
when that lack of candor and failure to take precedent seriously
had other effects, such as leading to confusion or uncertainty. But I
was more concerned about those effects, and in addition about
what the lack of candor might suggest regarding the extent to
which the Roberts Court takes precedent seriously, than I was about
lack of candor and transparency per se.
The conclusion that I've come to is that criticism about the
Court simply in terms of transparency and candor may lack some
candor in its own right. What I mean by this is that I think such
criticisms are often driven more by substantive and normative dis-
agreements with the results the Court reached than by neutral con-
cerns about candor. I tend to think it is better to acknowledge and
front those substantive disagreements in their own terms and di-
rectly engage in a debate about which values should govern consti-
tutional adjudication and which shouldn't.
Let me talk a little bit about some of the decisions tojustifi this
view. There are so many decisions you could use; I'm not going to
talk about all of them, maybe we'll add some more to the mix later
on. The three I thought I would focus on are the Hein decision,'
the United Haulers decision 2 -probably not on many people's lists
of the top ten from last year, but as a dormant Commerce Clause
aficionado it's one I like-and also Gonzales v. Carhart. 3
Hein arose out of President Bush's effort to expand participa-
tion of faith-based organizations in government programs.4 This
led to creation of certain faith-based offices in government agencies
and in the White House. Some taxpayers and an association
brought suit, challenging actions by the heads of these offices as
violating the Establishment Clause. 5 The issue in the case was not
the merits of the Establishment Clause challenge, but instead the
question of taxpayer standing and whether or not the 1968 decision
in Flast v. Cohen,6 which allowed taxpayer standing in the context of
an Establishment Clause challenge, should govern. The decision of
the Court was that it should not, 7 but there was no majority opin-
ion for that result. You had three justices in an opinion by Justice
1. Hein v. Freedom from Religion Found., 127 S. Ct. 2553 (2007).
2. United Haulers Ass'n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 127 S.
Ct. 1786 (2007).
3. 127 S. Ct. 1610 (2007).
4. Hein, 127 S. Ct. at 2559.
5. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
6. 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
7. Hein, 127 S. Ct. at 2559.
Imaged with the Permission of NYU Annual Survey of American Law
REMARKS OF GILLIAN E. METZGER
Alito saying that Flast didn't give standing in the current case be-
cause the faith-based program initiative was an instance of executive
action rather than a congressional statute. 8 One of those Justices
was Justice Kennedy, who in a separate concurrence emphasized
that he thought Flast was correct,9 whereas Justice Alito's stance was
simply that he wasn't going to extend F/ast to the full logic of its
reasoning and instead was limiting it to allowing a suit to challenge
congressional action.10 Justice Scalia, who concurred in the result,
thought that this distinction between congressional action and ex-
ecutive action in the context of standing to bring an Establishment
Clause challenge made absolutely no sense whatsoever. He pillo-
ried Justice Alito's opinion for lacking principle and logic, and con-
cluded that Flast should be overruled because it rested on notions
of what he called "psychic injury" that were incompatible with cur-
rent standing jurisprudence." Meanwhile, Justice Souter, writing
for the four dissenters, continued to adhere to Flast, arguing that it
was rightly decided. But Justice Souter agreed with Justice Scalia
that the plurality's distinction between congressional action and ex-
ecutive action made no sense. 12
I think Justice Scalia and the dissenters are correct that the
distinction between congressional action and executive action here
has little basis in logic or principle. I also think this distinction is
not particularly normatively or functionally appealing. It seems to
just offer up an immediate loophole for evasion of Establishment
Clause constraints, allowing more of a wink-and-a-nod kind of an
approach when Congress wants to bypass the possibility of an Estab-
lishment Clause challenge. And the only reason to have this dis-
tinction is not to have to overrule Fast. Now, that's a potentially
legitimate basis for a distinction, but it does seem to require some
account of why it is that the result in Flast was correct and worth
keeping. Instead of providing that account, Justice Alito andJustice
Kennedy basically said taxpayer standing for Establishment Clause
challenges goes this far and no further, and that was the end of
their reasoning.
So I think the Court's treatment of FRawt is flawed, though the
flaws are more failures of reasoning than lack of candor. In the
end, however, these failures don't bother me that much. Part of
why I'm not that bothered is that I don't think that Hein had that
8. Id.
9. Id. at 2572 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
10. Id. at 2568 (majority opinion).
11. Id. at 2573-74 (Scalia, J., concurring).
12. Id. at 2584 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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much of a practical effect (Steve [Shapiro], who actually litigates
here, can correct me on this), because after the prior decision in
Valley Forge, Fast had already been significantly narrowed. 13 True,
Valley Forge could be read as emphasizing either the clause involved
(the Property Clause as opposed to the Taxing and Spending
Clause) or the type of action at stake (congressional versus execu-
tive), and a subsequent decision involving executive action, Bowen
v. Kendrick, 14 had muddied the waters somewhat regarding when
taxpayer standing was available. But to the extent these intervening
decisions sowed confusion, Hein provided clarity. Basically, it's
clear after Hein that if you are going to sue on an Establishment
Clause basis and taxpayer standing, then you had better find very
specific congressional authorization to which you can tie your
challenge.
Thus, although arbitrary, the distinction between executive
and congressional action in Hein has the advantage of adding
greater certainty about when standing is and is not available for Es-
tablishment Clause challenges. In addition, I think it is hard to de-
cide whether or not to overrule F/ast without taking on some bigger
picture issues. In particular, if you look at all of the opinions, one
of the issues in debate is whether non-concrete or more aesthetic
injuries should ever suffice for standing. Justice Scalia was very du-
bious about that basis for standing, emphasizing more wallet or
more concrete injuries. 15 That is a point on which the dissent dis-
agreed, arguing that there are instances in which we tolerate stand-
ing based on aesthetic injuries.16 But as a result of its willingness to
allow aesthetic injury, the dissent is faced with the question of why
allowing standing here does not serve to open up the executive
branch to continual challenges, posing a real threat of intrusion on
its functioning. One way the dissent tried to limit that effect on the
13. Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ars. United for Separation of Church and
State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464 (1982). In Valley Forge, the Court rejected claims of tax-
payer standing to challenge the transfer of government property to a religious
college, emphasizing that the challenge was to executive rather than congressional
action and involved the Property Clause rather than the Establishment Clause to
distinguish Flast. Id. at 478-80. The Court also noted that even if the respondents
had satisfied the Flost analysis, they would encounter "serious difficulty in establish-
ing that they 'personally would benefit in a tangible way from the court's interven-
tion.'" Id. at 480 n.17 (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 508 (1975)).
14. 487 U.S. 589 (1988).
15. Hein, 127 S. Ct. at 2574 (Scalia, J., concurring).
16. Id. at 2587 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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executive branch was to draw a distinction between the Establish-
ment Clause and other kinds of constitutional challenges. 17
In other words, there were distinctions that were being drawn
in the other opinions too, and I'm not sure that you can figure out
whether it was better to front and either overrule or not overrule
FRast without deciding which of these other distinctions, if either,
had more merit. Another reason why I'm not too concerned about
Hein is because it involves standing doctrine, which is known to be
easily manipulatable. An additional example of that manipulability
last term came in Massachusetts v. EPA.18 In that 5-4 decision, a ma-
jority of the Court held that Massachusetts had standing to chal-
lenge the EPA's failure to regulate greenhouse gases, and claimed
that this holding was in keeping with an earlier major decision on
standing, Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife.19 I think that Massachusetts
and Lujan are actually in considerable tension, but such inconsis-
tency among precedents is not unusual in the standing area. The
bigger question is whether we should have an area of our jurispru-
dence that is so manipulatable, but given that we do, I'm not that
surprised by the Court's lack of candor regarding how its approach
in a case fits with other standing precedent.
Let me turn now to United Haulers.20 United Haulers involved a
dormant Commerce Clause challenge to a municipal flow control
ordinance which required that all solid waste in a couple of coun-
ties be taken for disposal at a county-owned solid waste facility. 21
In 1994, in a case called C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown,
also involving New York counties, the Court had held that a
county's similar flow control ordinance violated the dormant Com-
merce Clause when it required that waste be taken to a facility that
was privately owned for processing.22 In the United Haulers case, the
Court said the distinction between publicly owned and privately
owned facilities has constitutional significance, and rejected the
claim that use of a flow control ordinance in conjunction with a
publicly owned waste facility violated the dormant Commerce
Clause.23
17. Id. at 2585-88.
18. 127 S. Ct. 1438 (2007).
19. Id. at 1455 (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560
(1992)).
20. United Haulers Ass'n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 127
S. Ct. 1786 (2007).
21. Id. at 1790.
22. 511 U.S. 383, 386 (1994).
23. United Haulers, 127 S. Ct. at 1795-97.
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That's all well and good. The problem is that the facility in
Carbone was essentially public. It was privately owned for five years,
and then the county could buy it for a dollar.2 4 In other words, it
was a different funding mechanism, but both decisions involved es-
sentially public facilities in their practical effect. As a result, the
United Haulers dissent complained that in fact this case could not be
meaningfully distinguished from Carbone, and that the dormant
Commerce Clause claim should win here too.2 5 The United Haulers
majority insisted that the issue of public ownership had not been
reached in Carbone, and therefore it was free to find that that public
ownership in fact made a difference. 26 That's debatable, but re-
gardless, once the Court held that public ownership makes a differ-
ence, it needed to explain why the kind of mechanism for funding
that was present in Carbone still should be unconstitutional. And
that's exactly the question the majority didn't reach. It never ex-
plained why that kind of funding mechanism is still problematic
because it never took on Carbone.
I'm more skeptical and more critical of the Court's lack of can-
dor here. Why? Well, one reason is I think that the decision in
United Haulers creates much more uncertainty and imposes more
significant costs than the Court's decision in Hein. Counties are
now faced with trying to figure out how they thread the needle be-
tween these two decisions. Suppose a county has a publicly owned
facility, but wants to contract out its management. Is that going to
fall on the United Haulers side, or is that going to fall on the Carbone
side? In addition, there are costs attached to rejecting the funding
mechanism of having a private facility build and run the waste au-
thority facility for a few years, recoup a profit, and then turn it over
to the county. A county may not be as efficient a manager in get-
ting such a facility off the ground. Because the Court never took on
the question of why Carbone should continue to govern here, we
don't really have a good explanation of why localities should be
subject to those costs. In short, there's a real lack of justification
here that results in imposition of costs and uncertainties in ways
that I find more troubling than I do in the Hein context.
I would raise similar concerns about uncertainty in regard to
the Wisconsin Right to Life case,2 7 which I'm not going to talk that
much about. There you basically have the Court upholding an as-
applied challenge to the McCain-Feingold issue advocacy bans in a
24. Carbone, 511 U.S. at 383.
25. United Haulers, 127 S. Ct. at 1803 (Alito, J., dissenting).
26. Id. at 1790 (majority opinion).
27. FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2652 (2007).
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way that is simply at odds with its decision in 2003 in McConnell.28
That engendered some uncertainty about what continuing effect
McConnell has. I am also more troubled here by the sense that the
Court claimed to be adhering to McConnell in order to avoid ac-
knowledging that it is, in such short order, changing its view on
such a politically salient issue. In other words, this strikes me more
as possibly intentional public dissembling. On the other hand,
seven Justices stated that they believed that Wisconsin Right to Life
and McConnell could not be squared,29 so it's hard to conclude that
the Court as a whole was dissembling and lacking candor, even if
McConnell was not expressly overruled.
Finally, let me just say a couple of words about Gonzales v. Car-
hart.30 Here the Court sustained, against a facial challenge, the fed-
eral ban on so-called "partial birth" dilation and extraction
abortions despite having, seven years earlier, invalidated on facial
challenge a similar Nebraska measure.31 The Gonzales Court sought
to distinguish the earlier case, Stenberg v. Carhart, arguing in part
that different language in the federal act addressed the vagueness
and overbreadth concerns in Stenberg with respect to which proce-
dures were covered.3 2 What the Court didn't address adequately
was the fact that core to Stenberg, indeed core to Casey,33 core to
Roe,34 core to the Court's abortion jurisprudence generally, has
been an insistence on the need for a medical health exception for
when an abortion restriction might harm the health of the woman.
Yet in Gonzales v. Carhart, the Court upheld the federal ban despite
the fact it lacked such a health exception. In so doing, the Court
emphasized medical uncertainty about the possibility of harm to a
28. McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003).
29. Wisconsin Right to Life, 127 S. Ct. at 2684-86 (Scalia, J., concurring); id. at
2704-05 (Souter, J., dissenting).
30. 127 S. Ct. 1610 (2007).
31. Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 922 (2000).
32. Gonzales, 127 S. Ct. at 1628.
33. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 879-80 (1992) (stat-
ing that "the essential holding of Roe forbids a State to interfere with a woman's
choice to undergo an abortion procedure if continuing her pregnancy would con-
stitute a threat to her health" and concluding that a measure that imposes "signifi-
cant health risks" on a woman seeking an abortion would be unconstitutional,
though finding that the medical exception in the Pennsylvania law at issue satisfied
this requirement).
34. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164-65 (1973) (holding that the state may "reg-
ulate the abortion procedure in ways that are reasonably related to maternal
health" and may even proscribe abortion post-viability provided an exception is
made for instances when abortion "is necessary, in appropriate medical judgment,
for the preservation of the life or health of the mother").
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woman's health and that the case arose on a facial challenge.35 But
in Stenberg, medical uncertainty-the presence of some substantial
belief in the medical community that banning the procedure might
harm women's health-had been a reason why the Court had con-
cluded that a health exception was required.3 6 And, of course,
Stenberg had arisen on a facial challenge
3 7
Thus, I think the Court failed to acknowledge the extent to
which its decision in Gonzales was inconsistent with Stenberg. But
again, I am not that troubled by the Court's lack of candor per se; I
am more concerned about what this inconsistency signals about the
extent to which the Roberts Court feels bound by prior abortion
jurisprudence. I am also again concerned that the Court's recent
emphasis on the facial versus as-applied nature of a challenge has
the potential to lead to quite a lot of confusion. Although empha-
sizing this distinction, the Court hasn't explained at all when an as-
applied challenge should be available, what form that challenge
would take, and how to distinguish an as-applied challenge, particu-
larly if it is pre-enforcement, from a facial challenge.
Hence, as you can see, I do not in the end put that much
weight on candor about precedent for its own sake. Part of the
reason why I'm not so bothered by what appear as fairly specious
attempts to distinguish precedent is that it's often possible to read
precedent in different ways. Clearly wrong answers on that front
are, I think, somewhat rare. It's also because I can see some reasons
why candor may not always be the best approach. There are in-
stances where the Court has to reach a certain answer and it can't
necessarily get there and explain its actions unless it does so post
hoc. The Court is also a multi-member body, and reaching agree-
ment on a rule that everyone can sign onto sometimes may require
less explanation rather than more. As all of this suggests, I think
ultimately whether or not candor and candor about precedent are
valuable is an instrumental question. And you have to weigh factors
such as the uncertainty and confusion engendered by a decision,
and not simply the value of candor alone.
Finally, what I find lacking in these decisions is more an overt,
normative engagement with the real issues involved. In particular,
underlying these decisions is a debate over how much weight to
give stare decisis. It is not to me very surprising that Justice Scalia
and Justice Thomas are often the most insistent that rule of law and
35. Gonzaes, 127 S. Ct. at 1637.
36. Steberg, 530 U.S. at 938.
37. Id. at 922.
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principles of reasoning require overruling of prior decisions. They
are more willing to take that stance because I don't think they put
as much of a weight on stare decisis, particularly in the context of
constitutional adjudication. 38 I would rather see the argument di-
rectly engaged on the question of stare decisis and when it should
bind than on the question of whether the Court is being adequately
open and honest in its treatment of precedent. 39
38. See, e.g., BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 599 (1996) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 601 & n.8 (1995) (Thomas, J.,
concurring).
39. Many of the concurring and dissenting opinions in last Term's decisions
attempted to do so. See, e.g., FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2652,
2684-86 (2007) (Scalia, J., concurring); id. at 2704-05 (Souter, J., dissenting);
Hein v. Freedom from Religion Found., 127 S. Ct. 2553, 2584 (2007) (Scalia, J.,
concurring); Gonza/es, 127 S. Ct. at 1652-53 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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